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EDITORIAL
The appellate division of the supreme
court of the state of New York on June
13, 1930, handed down its decision in the
case of Ultramares Corporation, appellant, against the partners
of Touche, Niven & Co., respondents. The consequences of
this case will be far-reaching and it is gratifying to know that
the decision has been appealed to the court of appeals of the
state of New York. It is of the utmost importance that a
case of this sort should reach the highest court to which it can be
brought, so that the decision which shall ultimately appear will
be valuable as a precedent for future judgment and a basis of
future procedure. The doctrines enunciated by three judges of
the appellate division, if carried into effect, would have a vital
bearing upon the practice of every profession. The judges who
rendered this majority decision are John V. McAvoy, Victor J.
Dowling and James O’Malley. The dissenting opinion by Judges
Edward R. Finch and Francis Martin was presented at the same
time. Judge McAvoy, who rendered the decision for the
majority, said:

Accountants’ Liability
in Question

“The defendants, public accountants, have been held liable to
the plaintiff, to whom they owed no contractual duty through
any contract of employment which the plaintiff entrusted to
them. Whether a duty arises here, in the absence of direct con
tractual relation, out of the situation shown by the evidence, is
the problem for solution.
“The general principle involved, and upon which plaintiff
relies for imposition of liability, is that if one undertakes to dis
charge any duty by which the conduct of others may be governed,
he is bound to perform it in such a manner that those who are
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thus led to action in the faith that such duty will be properly
performed shall not suffer loss through improper performance of
the duty or neglect in its execution. Thus, we have the buyers of
merchandise given recovery against public weighers who were
to make return of the weight and to furnish buyers with a copy.
The public weighers certified the weight and the buyers paid the
sellers on that basis. Discovery that the weight had been in
correctly certified as a result of defendant’s negligence was found
to give the plaintiffs the right to the resulting damage.
“It was decided there that the use of the certificates was not
an indirect or collateral consequence of the action of the weighers;
that it was a consequence ‘which, to the weighers’ knowledge,
was the end and aim of the transaction.’ The sellers ordered,
but the buyers were to use the certificates. Public weighers hold
themselves out to the public as ‘ skilled and careful in their calling.’
(Glanzer v. Shepard, 233 N. Y. 236, 238.)
“The duty was held not to be bound in terms of contract,
nor of privity; although arising from contract, its origin is not ex
clusive from that realm. If the contract and the relation are
found, the duty follows by rule of law. Diligence—it was
pointed out—was owing not only to the person who ordered the
employment, but also to those who relied thereon.
“Plaintiff here is in the business of factoring. The defendants
were engaged by Fred Stern & Co., Inc., to audit its books and ac
counts and certify a balance-sheet as of the end of the year 1923.
They prepared a balance-sheet and attached it to a certificate
signed by them, which they dated February 26, 1924. This
balance-sheet stated that Fred Stern & Co., Inc., had a net worth
amounting to $1,070,715.26, when the fact (as thereafter found)
was that at the very time of this certification the firm was in
solvent, with impairment of thousands of dollars in its assets and
credit and much enhancement of its reported liabilities.
“The finding of the jury would justify a conclusion that de
fendants were guilty of a gross degree of negligence in their audit,
and it is even urged that the evidence also warranted the finding
that the balance-sheet was made up in fraud of the rights and
obligations which accountants, engaged in public calling, would
owe to those to whom they had reason to believe such balancesheets would be exhibited for purposes of obtaining loans, ex
tending credit or to induce the sale of merchandise.
“The evidence showed that these accountants knew for four
years that their client (Fred Stern & Co., Inc.) was a borrower from
banks in large sums; that these banks required certified balancesheets as a basis for making loans; and that Fred Stern & Co., Inc.,
would require these certified balance-sheets for continuing existing
loans and securing new loans. So that this might be done, some
thirty-two original counterparts of the certified balance-sheet
were requested by the client, Fred Stern & Co., Inc., and fur
nished by the accountants (defendants).
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“The jury’s verdict thus imports that defendants knew that
the certified balance-sheets would be used by Fred Stern & Co.,
Inc., for the purpose of procuring loans, and that the very
purpose of employment in the transaction between Fred Stern &
Co., Inc., and Touche, Niven & Co., the accountants, was to
allow Fred Stern & Co., Inc., to bring it about through these
balance-sheets. This results: that loans on the faith thereof
would be made by persons who would be governed by its declara
tions. Financial statements in the course of trade have come to
be used customarily for the purpose of securing credit, and ac
countants indicate in their public advertisements that makers
of loans should require the safeguard of an independent audit pre
pared by public accountants, so a corelative obligation is placed
upon them. It is their duty—if they do not wish their audit to
be so used—to qualify the statement of their balance-sheet and
the certificate which accompanies it in such a way as to prevent
its use. One cannot issue an unqualified statement which will
be so used, and then disclaim responsibility for his work.
“Banks and merchants, to the knowledge of these defendants,
require certified balance-sheets from independent accountants,
and upon these audits they make their loans. Thus, the duty
arises to these banks and merchants of an exercise of reasonable
care in the making and uttering of certified balance-sheets.
“The facts here are brought within the rule in the case of
International Products Co. v. Erie Railroad Co. (244 N. Y. 331)
that ‘there must be knowledge, or its equivalent, that the in
formation is desired for a serious purpose; that he to whom it is
given intends to rely and act upon it; that if false or erroneous he
will, because of it, be injured in person or property. . . . The
relationship of the parties, arising out of contract or otherwise,
must be such that in morals and good conscience the one has the
right to rely upon the other for information, and the other giving
the information owes a duty to give it with care.’
“The certificate which these accountants attached to the
balance-sheet reads:
“‘Touche, Niven & Co.,
‘ Public Accountants,
‘Eighty Maiden Lane,
‘New York.
‘February 26, 1924.
‘ Certificate

of

Auditors.

‘ We have examined the accounts of Fred Stern & Co., Inc., for the year ended
December 31, 1923, and hereby certify that the annexed balance-sheet is in
accordance therewith and with the information and explanations given us.
We further certify that, subject to provisions for federal taxes on income, the
said statement, in our opinion, presents a true and correct view of the financial
condition of Fred Stern & Co., Inc., as at December 31, 1923.
‘Touche, Niven & Co.,
‘ Public Accountants.’
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“From this certificate and the findings made by the jury which
are entitled to be held conclusive in behalf of the plaintiff there is
established: that the defendants knew that the result of the audit
would be used by Fred Stern & Co., Inc., to represent its financial
condition to persons from whom Fred Stern & Co., Inc., might
seek to borrow money, and that the balance-sheet would be
relied upon by such persons as indicating the true financial con
dition of Fred Stern & Co., Inc.; that defendants, in exercising
their public calling as auditors, did not exercise that care and skill
required of them, but acted in a negligent and careless manner, as
a consequence of which the balance-sheet made by them was in
correct, and that such negligence was the proximate cause of the
loss sustained by plaintiff, i. e., that there was a causal relation
between the neglect and the loss sustained which could reasonably
have been anticipated, and that the presentation of the balancesheets, as certified by defendants, was the inducing cause for
making these loans to Fred Stern & Co., Inc., which plaintiff
made, and that the loss was not caused by reason of any change
in the financial condition of Fred Stern & Co., Inc., from the time
of the presentation of the audit to the plaintiff, or because of any
reliance of plaintiff on other intervening causes; and that plain
tiff’s conduct was free from contributory negligence; and we there
fore conclude that a liability was properly found, arising out of a
duty owed by the defendants to plaintiff not to misrepresent,
wilfully or negligently, the financial condition of Fred Stern &
Co., Inc., and that the judgment for the plaintiff was correct
and should not have been set aside.
“That the particular person who was to be influenced by
defendants’ act was unknown to the defendants is not material
to a right to recovery, for it is not ‘ necessary that there should be
an intent to defraud any particular person.’ In this case there
was no mere casual representation made as a matter of courtesy;
there was a certificate intended to sway conduct. There was
‘the careless performance of a service which found in the words
of a certificate its culmination and its summary.’ Here is an act
performed carelessly, intended to influence the actions of third
parties, and one that reasonably might be expected, when care
lessly performed, to cause substantial loss.
“A duty exists towards those whom the accountants know
will act on the faith of their certificates. The loss occurring
here was the very result which reasonably was to be anticipated
if the balance-sheet was carelessly prepared.
“While negligence was established and was the proximate
cause of the loss, and, as we have seen, the duty arose out of this
situation which, while not contractual, was, nevertheless, a
ground of liability, yet we do not think that there was sufficient
proof upon which to found a liability in fraud. We think that
there was no error, at the close of the entire case, in the court’s
decision to dismiss the second cause of action based upon that
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ground. Misjudgment, however gross, or want of caution,
however marked, is not fraud. The mere breach of duty or the
omission to use due care is not fraud. Intentional fraud, as
distinguished from a mere breach of duty or the omission to use
due care, is an essential factor in an action for deceit. (Kountze
v. Kennedy, 147 N. Y. 124.)
“We think that there was a proper conclusion with respect
to damages. The amount of cash loans made to Fred Stern &
Co., Inc., with interest thereon, credited with all monies repaid
or collected by plaintiff, whether through voluntary action or
suit, without deduction of costs of collection, was the approximate
damage, and while other proof of damage was excluded by the
trial court, no appeal has been taken by plaintiff which raises a
construction of that rule.
“The judgment and order appealed from should therefore be
modified by reversing so much thereof as sets aside the verdict and
dismisses the amended complaint as to the first cause of action,
and by directing that the verdict be reinstated and judgment
entered thereon with costs to the plaintiff, and as so modified
affirmed without costs.”
The dissenting opinion reads as follows;
“Assuming that the defendants may be
held liable for the negligence of their
employees where they undertake a duty to a definite plaintiff
(Glanzer v. Shepard, 233 N. Y. 236), or to a definite class (Doyle
v. Chatham & Phoenix National Bank, 253 N. Y. 369), yet, for
the following reasons, the defendants are not liable to this plain
tiff: first, because they undertook to make only a ‘balancesheet audit’ at the request of their client; second, because in
their certificate the defendants purported only to furnish their
opinion based upon an examination in connection with ‘the in
formation and explanations given us.’ But even more important,
the defendants furnished such a report and certificate without
reference to any particular person or class of persons.
“The plaintiff seeks to liken the facts in the case at bar to a case
where the defendants were to make an audit which to their knowl
edge was for a definite plaintiff, to induce such plaintiff to make
loans thereon. (Glanzer v. Shepard, supra.) This record does
not sustain such a contention. The courts have not gone to the
length of holding that defendants in a case like the case at bar
can be held liable in negligence to the whole world, or, as has
been aptly said, liable for ‘negligence in the air.’
“ In other words, not only the purpose for which the statement
is to be used, but the person or class of persons who is to rely
thereon, must be definite to the knowledge of the defendants.
The plaintiff relies upon the stipulation in the record that the
defendants ‘knew generally that these reports would be used as

Contrary Opinion
of Question
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financial statements to banks or to creditors or to stockholders
or to purchasers or sellers.’ In accordance with the authorities,
this general knowledge is not sufficient.
“As Judge Andrews said in International Products Co. v. Erie
R. R. Co. (244 N. Y. 231), speaking of the information given,
“‘that he to whom it is given intends to rely and act upon
it; that if false or erroneous he will because of it be injured
in person or property.’

In Courteen Seed Co. v. Hong Kong & Shanghai Banking Corpora
tion (245 N. Y. 377), Judge Pound writes:
“‘It (the defendant) did not deal with appellant, had no
relations with it and was under no duty of care to it.’ (See
also Savings Bank v. Ward, 100 U. S. 195.)

“The professional man, be he accountant or otherwise, cer
tifies for his client and not for all the world. If the client makes
it clear to such a man that the statement is to be used in a particu
lar transaction in which a third party is involved, such circum
stances should create a duty from the professional man to such
third party. If the accountant is to be held to an unlimited
liability to all persons who may act on the faith of the certificate,
the accountant would be obliged to protect himself by a verifica
tion so rigid that its cost might well be prohibitive and a limited
but useful field of service thus closed to him. The smallness of
the compensation paid to the defendants for the services requested
is in striking contrast to the enormity of the liability now sought
to be imposed upon them. If in the case at bar the plaintiff had
inquired of the accountants whether they might rely upon the
certificate in making a loan, then the accountants would have
had the opportunity to gauge their responsibility and risk, and
determine with knowledge how thorough their verification of the
account should be before assuming the responsibility of making
the certificate run to the plaintiff.
“It also appears in the case at bar that the loss of the plaintiff
resulted because of its own contributory negligence in failing
to check the collateral. (Craig v. Anyon, 212 App. Div. 55;
aff’d 242 N. Y. 569.)
“In so far as the claim of actual fraud is concerned, there is
no proof in this record sufficient to support such a finding by a
jury. The court, therefore, properly dismissed this cause of
action. (Civil practice act. section 457-a.) This is so, even
assuming that personal connivance and fraud on the part of the
employees of defendants could be held within the scope of the
authority given to these employees by the defendants, which at
least is doubtful. (Henry v. Allen, 151 N. Y. 1; Credit Alliance
Corp. v. Sheridan Theatre Co., 241 N. Y. 216; Martin v. Gotham
Nat'l. Bank, 248 N. Y. 313.)
“It follows that the judgment and order should be affirmed.”
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We print the two opinions in full be
cause of the tremendous effect which
either will have upon the future of all
professional work. If the majority opinion is allowed to stand it
is impossible to foresee its full consequence, but this much seems
certain, that a professional man, be he lawyer, physician, ac
countant, architect, engineer or any other, will hesitate to express
any opinion whatsoever in a positive way lest some third, fourth
or one-hundredth person, not specifically contemplated at the
time of the rendering of the opinion, may suffer or believe that he
has suffered unduly and therefore demand from the professional
man a “full, sufficient and perfect” satisfaction. An illustration
of the way in which the dictum of the majority of the appellate
division, if applied, as it would necessarily be applied, in all pro
fessions if it were applied in one, can be found in a hypothetical
case. Let us suppose that a lawyer is called in to express an opin
ion as to the effect of certain obligations assumed in a contract
between two stock-ownership corporations. The client of the
lawyer is one of these corporations. The lawyer, after reviewing
the contract in its express terms, believes that it is sufficiently
binding to protect the interests which his client desires to protect.
For the sake of argument let us admit that the lawyer in making
this review has overlooked some weakness which might have been
discovered if he had had reason to suspect fraudulent intent on the
part of the other corporation and let us suppose that the courts
would consider this negligence. Subsequently, the weakness in the
contract appears and the client corporation suffers the loss of
substantial business and may ultimately find its way into bank
ruptcy because of the operations of a contract not sufficiently
protective. Is it to be supposed that a bank which has lent
money to the client corporation can demand and recover from
the lawyer whose advice was erroneous the full extent of its
financial loss? Of course every lawyer knows that such a
doctrine does not prevail. Or suppose that a physician is called in
to diagnose a case and he dismisses it, without sufficient investi
gation, as simply a case of chicken pox. In the course of a few
days it develops that the disease is small pox and the house in
which it occurs is quarantined and becomes in the public estima
tion a pest house. There is an important property damage which
might have been avoided if the disease had been originally properly
diagnosed and the patient removed before publicity attended the
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matter. If the doctrine of the majority opinion of the appellate
division were to prevail the owner of the house could recover from
the physician who rendered the opinion satisfaction for the finan
cial loss attendant upon the occurrence of the disease.
We are not at the present time directly
concerned with the question of negli
gence which is raised in the case. It is
gratifying to see that the decisions in every court brush aside all
question of fraud. The worst that is admitted in any decision is
negligence, and this the defendant denies. For the purpose of
procuring the most far-reaching opinion of the courts it might
perhaps be as well if the question of negligence were involved,
because in time to come it is inevitable that there will be cases
involving even gross negligence wherein the courts will be called
upon to adjudicate points of financial responsibility. Where
there is no negligence it does not seem to us conceivable that any
court of competent jurisdiction would for a moment hold an
accountant responsible for a failure to discover something which
he could not reasonably be expected to discover. There is legal
precedent for such an assertion. Where, however, there is accusa
tion of negligence, whether well-founded or not, it is still doubtful
whether a professional man is responsibile for the effects of his
advice, but we must all admit that it is the duty of the courts to
determine the extent of that financial responsibility if such re
sponsibility there be. The moral responsibility is one which will
probably not be called in question. It is the duty of every pro
fessional man, as we are firmly convinced the defendants in the
present suit did not fail to recognize, that fair, impartial and
frank expression of the truth must be made.

Responsibility Where
Negligence is Alleged

The brief which was filed on behalf of
the American Institute of Accountants,
as amicus curiæ, was prepared by
Messrs. Covington, Burling and Rublee, counsel of the American
Institute of Accountants, and presented by Messrs. Coudert
Brothers, of the New York bar. This brief agrees to a great
extent with the opinion rendered by the minority of the appellate
division. It concerns itself solely with the question as to
whether there was or was not any privity of interest between
the accountants and the bankers who advanced money to
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Fred Stern & Co., Inc. We are inclined to think that an
equally important question in the case is the whole matter of
professional liability even where negligence is said to exist
or even where it is found to exist. It is all very well to say that
a man should not render an opinion which he is not prepared to
support to the extent of his financial responsibility, but if this
were carried to its logical conclusion it would become necessary
for every professional man to divest himself of all financial re
sponsibility, because, however careful he might be he could be
found, by some court, negligent in the performance of his duty
and thereby financially liable. The brief presented on behalf of
the American Institute of Accountants was an able exposition of
the case which seems to us to deal comprehensively with the
points raised in the majority opinion of the court and to dispose of
them completely. The following extracts from the brief are of
special application:

Statement

"This brief is directed solely to the question of whether there
was any privity between the plaintiff and defendants, whereby it
could have been held that the defendants had been guilty of a
breach of duty to the plaintiff.
"Accountants are engaged by a corporation to examine its
accounts and prepare a balance-sheet. The accountants do so,
and give their certificate attesting to the examination and certify
ing that the balance-sheet ‘is in accordance therewith and with
the information and explanations given us,’ and that it presents
in the accountants’ opinion a true and correct view of the cor
poration’s financial condition. The accountants are not informed
that the balance-sheet and certificate are to be presented to the
plaintiff or that they are to be used for any particular purpose,
but the accountants know generally that the report will be used
as a financial statement to banks or to creditors or to stockholders
or to purchasers or sellers. The plaintiff advances money to the
corporation relying upon the correctness of the balance-sheet and
Certificate of the defendants. The corporation is adjudged a
bankrupt, and some of the moneys advanced are not repaid to the
plaintiff. If the balance-sheet was incorrect and if the account
ant was negligent in preparing it, can such a plaintiff recover his
losses from the accountant?
"The American Institute of Accountants, which contains within
its membership persons in all parts of the United States who are
engaged in the practice of accountancy, is interested in this
question. It submits this brief as amicus curia, in support of the
decision of the court below, where it was held that there existed
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no privity between the lender and the accountants whereby the
lender could complain of the breach of any legal duty.
“This brief does not deal with the question of whether or not in
fact there was negligence by the accountants; whether such
negligence if it existed was the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s
loss; the possible effect of intervening fraudulent acts of Stern,
or the effect of contributory negligence by the plaintiff.

“POINT I
“The accountant should not be liable to one who is un
known TO HIM.
“The professional man who certifies to the correctness of a
statement, be he lawyer, abstractor, surveyor, weigher, tester, or
accountant, does so for his client or employer, not for all the world.
If the client or employer makes it clear to the professional man
that the statement is to be used in a particular transaction in
which a third party is involved, the circumstances may create a
duty from the professional man to such a third party. But it is
difficult to imagine any circumstances which would place upon
the professional man who furnishes a certificate a duty to all
persons into whose hands the certificate may find its way.
“Such a theory would in effect make the certificate a quasi
negotiable instrument passing from hand to hand and entitling
the bearer to damages against the professional man.
‘‘ If such a rule should be adopted it would be impossible for the
professional man to determine what his fee should be for making
the certificate, since he would have no means of determining the
possible extent of his responsibility.
“An accountant must always determine how thorough his
verification of accounts is to be. There is always an element of
discretion in his work. If his certificate is merely for the security
of the person who employs him, the accountant may be justified in
accepting information from such person which he should not pass
without further verification if he is informed that a third party is to
act on the certificate. There is always a point at which the degree
of verification should stop in order to prevent the cost of an audit
from being out of all proportion to reason, and this point is to be
determined in each case largely by the relationship between the
accountant and his client and the definite use to which the ac
countant knows the certificate is to be put. If the accountant
were to be held to an unlimited liability to all persons who may
act on the faith of the certificate, the accountant would be put
under an enormous responsibility and would be obliged to protect
himself by a verification so rigid that its cost would usually be
prohibitive.
“Counsel for the appellant argue that the accountants in the
case at bar might by appropriate language have limited their
obligation to their employer, and not having done so their obliga
90

Editorial

tion became unlimited (appellant’s brief, page 68). Such an
argument leads nowhere, for the converse is just as logical and is
more in accordance with sound business practices. If the plain
tiff in the case at bar had wished to rely upon the accountants’
certificate as a basis for making the loan, the plaintiff could readily
have demanded from the borrower a certificate running to the plaintiff.
The certificate the defendants had given their client stated that
the balance-sheet was in part in accordance with ‘ the information
and explanations given us.’ Had the plaintiff asked that the cer
tificate run to its benefit it is reasonable to believe that the plain
tiff would have been informed what the ‘ information ’ and ‘ expla
nations’ were, or that the accountants would have stated how
thorough their verification of accounts had been and whether
they thought the verification sufficient for plaintiff’s purposes. If
such a certificate had been obtained a basis would have been
established for claiming that the accountants owed a duty to the
plaintiff, and the accountants, learning the definite purpose for
which the certificate was required could have gauged their re
sponsibility and risk and could intelligently have determined how
thorough their verification of accounts should have been before
making a certificate to the plaintiff.
“We shall endeavor to show in the following pages of this brief
that the decision of the court below is consistent with the decisions
in this state and with the law generally on the subject, and that
liability for negligence by a professional man in preparing a
certificate is not extended to persons who were unknown to him.

“POINT II
“The New York decisions relied on by appellant can
READILY BE DISTINGUISHED.

“In their brief (p. 79) under the heading ‘The Law’ counsel
for the appellant say:
“‘The leading cases in this state are Glanzer v. Shepard,
233 N. Y. 236, and International Products Co. v. Erie R. R.
Co., 244 N.Y. 331.’

“In Glanzer v. Shepard, 233 N. Y. 236, Bech Van Siclen &
Company had sold to the plaintiff 905 bags of beans, to be paid
for in accordance with weight sheets certified by public weighers.
The seller requested the defendants, who were public weighers,
to make a return of the weight and to furnish the buyers with
a copy. The return of the weighers recited that it had been
made by order of Bech Van Siclen & Company ‘for G. Bros.’
(the plaintiffs). The weighers sent one copy to the seller (the
plaintiffs). The court said,
‘ “The plaintiffs’ use of the certificates was not an indirect
or collateral consequence of the action of the weighers. It
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was a consequence which to the weighers’ knowledge, was
the end and aim of the transaction. * * * They sent a copy to
the plaintiffs for the very purpose of inducing action. ’

“In International Products Co. v.Erie R. R. Co., 244 N. Y. 331,
the plaintiff, an importer, was expecting a consignment of goods
by steamer. It arranged with defendant, a common carrier, to
receive them on its lighters, transfer them to its warehouse docks
and then ship them upon order. After the steamer arrived the
plaintiff inquired of the defendant where the goods were to be
stored and stated to the defendant that it desired this information
for the purpose of obtaining insurance. The defendant, taking
time to obtain the required information, replied that they were
docked at dock F, Weehawken. The plaintiff obtained its
insurance, passing on to the insurer the information given to it by
the defendant. As a matter of fact the goods had not been
received by defendant, when it gave plaintiff the information,
and when they were subsequently received one-half of them were
stored at dock D, which dock with the goods thereon was sub
sequently destroyed by fire. Plaintiff could not recover its insur
ance because of the misdescription and sued defendant for its
negligent statement.
“These cases can readily be distinguished from the case at bar.
In each of them the defendant dealt directly with the plaintiff,
and had actual and exact knowledge of the purpose for which the
information was to be given the plaintiff. In the case at bar the
defendants did not deal with the plaintiff, had no knowledge that
the certificate was obtained for the purpose of obtaining a loan
from the plaintiff, and in fact had no knowledge of the plaintiff in
the transaction.

“POINT III
“Savings bank v. ward, 100 u. s. 195, completely sustains
THE DISTINCTION MADE BY THE COURT BELOW.

“Counsel for the appellant contend that the fact that it was
stipulated
“‘that they (defendants) knew generally that these reports
would be used as financial statements to banks or to creditors
or to stockholders or to purchasers or sellers ’ (fol. 581),
was sufficient to make the respondents liable to any person who
might lend money on the strength of the report, and, at page 93
of their brief, the appellant’s counsel say:
“‘We are confident that no authority will be cited by de
fendants which supports the claim that they are without any
duty toward those who they know will act upon the faith of
their certificates, or that distinguishes between cases where
the defendants have knowledge that an individual plaintiff
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will act or that some member of a class, of which the plaintiff
is one, will act upon their certificate.’
“In making this broad statement counsel overlook the decision
of the supreme court of the United States in Savings Bank v.
Ward, 100 U. S. 195, a case which is of particular interest in that
it was cited and quoted with approval, or at least with acquies
cence, in Glanzer v. Shepard, 233 N. Y. 236, upon which appellant
relies.
“In that case the defendant, an attorney, was employed by
Chapman to examine Chapman’s title to certain real estate. In
pursuance of such employment the defendant gave Chapman,
who paid him therefor, a certificate of title wherein the defendant
certified that Chapman had good title to the real estate and that
it was unencumbered. With the aid of this certificate Chapman
obtained a loan from the plaintiff bank upon the security of the
property named in the certificate. The defendant attorney was
negligent in that he had overlooked a deed executed by Chapman
and recorded shortly prior to the date of his certificate, by which
deed Chapman had conveyed the property covered by the certifi
cate to a third party so that Chapman had no title. The plain
tiff’s security therefore was of no value, and the plaintiff claimed
damages as a result of the negligence of the defendant. Suit was
thus brought by the plaintiff bank against the defendant attorney.
The action was dismissed, the court saying, at page 205:
“ ‘. . . the difficulty in the way of the plaintiffs is that they
never employed the defendant to search the records, examine the
title, or make the report, and it clearly appears that he never
performed any such service at their request or in their behalf,
and that they never paid him any thing for the service he did
perform in respect to that transaction; nor is there any evidence
tending to show any privity of contract between them and the
defendant, within the meaning of the law as expounded by the
decisions of the court.'
“The especial significance of this decision, in view of the state
ment of appellant’s counsel, lies in the fact that there, as is con
tended in the case at bar, the defendant had every reason to be
lieve that the certificate would be used as the basis of a loan.
Thus the evidence for the defendant showed
“' that the said Chapman did not communicate to the defendant
for what purpose he wanted the certificate; but that, unless a
contrary opinion were expressed, he, defendant, would have
supposed from the usual course of business, knowing Chapman
to be the owner of the property about to be examined, that the
certificate was obtained for the use of a prospective lender or
purchaser. ’ (See page 8 of the record in that case which is
found in volume 7 of the transcript of records of the supreme
court for the October term, 1879, at page 5123.)
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‘ ‘ The plaintiff’s first prayer for instructions was:
“'If the jury shall find from the evidence that the de
fendant held himself out to the public as a person skilled in the
examination of titles to real estate in the District of Columbia
and that he was employed as such skilled examiner of titles
aforesaid by Leonard S. Chapman to examine the titles to the
property in question, that as a result of said examination
the defendant gave to the said Chapman who paid him
therefor the two certificates in evidence, the defendant know
ing that he thereby enabled the said Chapman to get credit from
the public as the owner of the property so certified by the de
fendant to be the unencumbered property of the said Chapman;
and if the jury shall further find that the plaintiff gave credit
to the said Chapman upon the faith of the said certificate;
then the jury are instructed as a matter of law that these
facts confer upon the plaintiff a legal right to maintain his
action although no contract relations existed between him
and the defendant.’
This prayer was denied, and the plaintiff excepted. See page 8
of the record referred to.
“It is noteworthy that this case was not allowed to go to the
jury. The record shows that a verdict was directed for the
defendant. And it was this directed verdict that was affirmed by
the supreme court.
“It is not necessary to go to the record, however, to ascertain
that the supreme court passed on the question of whether liability
was established by the general understanding of the attorney that
the certificate would be used as the basis of a loan. In the dis
senting opinion occurs the direct statement:

“ ‘ Ward was employed by Chapman to examine and certify
to the title to a certain lot in Washington. The circumstances
were such as ought to have satisfied him that his certificate was
to be used by Chapman in some transaction with another person
as evidence of the facts certified to. ’

“But, as has been stated, the majority of the United States
supreme court held that this was not sufficient to establish liability
for negligence to persons who might rely on the certificate as
evidence of such facts, since the defendant ‘ never performed any
such service at their request and in their behalf,’ and since there
was 'no evidence tending to show any privity of contract between
them and the defendant.’
“This decision is also interesting in that it distinguished the
cases of poisoning, etc., where, the act of negligence being im
minently dangerous to the lives of others, the wrong-doer is liable
to the injured party, whether there is any contract relationship
between them or not.
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“POINT IV
“Many decisions involving accountants, abstractors,
TESTERS, INSPECTORS AND ARCHITECTS SUSTAIN THE PROPOSITION
THAT AN ACTION FOR NEGLIGENCE IN A CERTIFICATE CAN ONLY BE
MAINTAINED WHERE THERE IS PRIVITY.
“In Landell v. Lybrand, 264 Pa. 406, public accountants were
employed by a corporation to audit its books. The plaintiff
Landell bought eleven shares of stock in the corporation on the
strength of the report prepared by the accountants as to assets
and liabilities of the corporation. The report of the accountants
had been shown to the plaintiff by one who suggested that the
plaintiff buy the stock. The report was alleged to be untrue and
the plaintiff, having relied on the report, claimed damages. For
the purposes of the decision the allegations of the complaint were
taken as true. The court held that there was no duty owed to the
plaintiff and therefore there was no liability.
“ In Day v. Reynolds, 23 Hun. 131, one O’Donnell, by his agent
Winslow, applied to the plaintiff for a loan to be secured by a
mortgage on certain property which O’Donnell claimed to own.
The plaintiff told the agent to procure a proper search from the
county clerk’s office and if the property was clear the loan would
be made. The search was made by defendant, who was paid for
his services by O’Donnell. The defendant did not know for what
purpose the abstract was obtained. The abstract showed the
title to be good, and a loan was made to O’Donnell by plaintiff
on the faith of the abstract. At the time of making the search
and lending the money there was on record a deed from O’Don
nell, conveying the land to a third party, which deed was not
mentioned in the search. Because of this deed plaintiff was
unable to collect his money on the mortgage, and O’Donnell was
insolvent. It was held that as the defendant had no knowledge
that the abstract was obtained for the purpose of getting a loan
the defendant was not liable.
“In Glawatz v. Peoples Guaranty Search Co., 49 App. Div. 465,
defendant prepared and furnished to one Peacock upon his re
quest an abstract of title to certain premises owned by Peacock.
The certificate ran to Peacock, his heirs, devisees and grantees,
and to Eastern Building and Loan Association, mortgagee. The
abstract contained a statement to the effect that a certain mort
gage on the premises was for $3,000. In fact this mortgage was
for $3,200. Subsequently Peacock conveyed to Bane, and Bane
conveyed to the plaintiff, to whom the abstract was delivered.
In completing her purchase, in consequence of the erroneous state
ment referred to above, plaintiff paid $200 in excess of what she
otherwise would have paid. The court held there was no duty
owing from the defendant to the plaintiff, and refused to allow a
recovery.
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“In Talpey v. Wright, 61 Ark. 275, one Rhea applied to the
defendants for an abstract of title to certain land owned by him,
and defendants furnished him with such an abstract. On the
faith of the abstract an investment company loaned Rhea $2,100,
and took his notes secured by a trust of the land covered by the
abstract. After the loan had been accepted by the investment
company the defendants completed the abstract of title by noting
the deed of trust made by Rhea to secure the notes. Through
neglect of the defendants there was a mistake in the certificate.
The plaintiff bought from the investment company the notes
secured by the deed of trust but before buying them demanded a
title abstract. The investment company exhibited to the plain
tiff the abstract prepared by the defendant and on the faith of that
the plaintiff bought the notes. The plaintiff, the purchaser of
the notes, sued the abstractor but the court refused to allow
recovery on the ground that there was no privity.
“In National Iron and Steel Co. v. Hunt, 312 Ill. 245, the
defendants held themselves out as expert inspectors and testers of
construction and building materials. At the request of plaintiff’s
vendor, they made for plaintiff’s vendor an inspection of re-laying
rails and issued a certificate of inspection to plaintiff’s vendor.
Plaintiff purchased the rails from the party to whom the certifi
cate had been issued, and relied on the certificate. Defendants
did not deliver a certificate to the plaintiff, nor were they advised
that the plaintiff was going to rely on their inspection. The rails
turned out to be of a poorer grade than the certificate stated and
plaintiff sued the inspectors. It was held that there could be no
recovery.
“In Gordon v. Livingston, 12 Mo. App. 267, Livingston in
spected some wheat for Empire Mills, and certified that he had
inspected for account of the Empire Mills out of a certain grain
elevator into a certain barge 20,000 bushels of number one, red
winter wheat. He was employed by the Empire Mills and gave
his certificate to them. They had sold the wheat to the plaintiff,
and it was loaded in a barge to be shipped to the plaintiff. By
the recognized custom of the trade, the certificate of inspection
accompanied the draft sent the purchaser of the grain, who usually
accepted and paid the draft without inspecting the grain. The
plaintiff paid the draft which accompanied Livingston’s certificate
on the faith of the certificate and without examining the wheat.
The certificate was incorrect, and the plaintiff sued Livingston for
negligence. The court held that no duty was owed by Livingston
to the plaintiff and that therefore he was not liable.
“In Le Lievre v. Gould (1893) 1 Q. B. 491, an owner of land
agreed to convey to a builder certain land for an annual rental of a
fixed amount, the builder agreeing as a condition precedent to the
conveyance to erect two dwellings thereon to the satisfaction of
the owner or his architect. The owner employed defendant as
his architect who agreed to give certificates from time to time as
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to the progress of the work. The owner arranged to have a third
person lend a specified amount to the builder to build the build
ing, such loan to be secured by mortgage from the builder to the
third person. The owner gave to the architect a schedule of ad
vances to be made under the mortgage as the work progressed.
Thereafter the mortgage was executed. The architect was
negligent in giving incorrect certificates as to the progress of the
work. The mortgagee who relied on them in making advances
was damaged and entered suit against the architect. The suit
was dismissed because there was no privity of contract between
the architect and plaintiff and no duty owed by the architect to
the plaintiff, Lord Ersher, M. R., saying:
“‘A man is entitled to be as negligent as he pleases towards
the whole world if he owes no duty to them.’

“Other cases to the same effect are Thomas v. Guaranty Title &
Trust Co., 81 Ohio St. 432; Equitable Building and Loan Associa
tion v. Bank of Commerce and Trust Co., 118 Tenn. 678; and
Lockwood v. Title Insurance Co., 130 N. Y. S. 824.

“ Conclusion
“It is therefore respectfully submitted that the decision of the
court below was correct and should be affirmed, on the ground that
there was no such duty from the defendants to the plaintiff as
would allow a recovery.
“Dated, May 12, 1930.
“Respectfully submitted,
“American Institute of Accountants
“As Amicus Curice
“By Coudert Brothers,
“Attorneys.
“Frederic R. Coudert,
“Mahlon B. Doing,
“No. 2 Rector St., New York City.
“and
“J. Harry Covington,
“Spencer Gordon,
“Union Trust Building, Washington, D. C.,
“Of Counsel.”
Inasmuch as the matter is now in a sense
sub judice, awaiting a hearing and
decision by the court of appeals, it
might be improper to analyze in detail the process of reasoning
by which the majority members of the appellate division
97

The Ultimate Effect of
Decision if Sustained

The Journal of Accountancy

reached their decision. On the one point of financial responsi
bility it may be proper to point out that the professional man
who assumes a responsibility to all the world, as Judge Walsh in
the lower court very appropriately described it, would have to
charge fees for his services sufficient to cover any possible assess
ment of damages, and, inasmuch as responsibility to all the world
is a fairly comprehensive matter, it would seem that the fees
charged in any case should be all the money in the world—which,
of course is reductio ad absurdum. It is known that the Ameri
can Institute of Accountants hopes to be permitted to appear as
amicus curiae before the court of appeals in its effort to main
tain its contention. Until that appeal shall have been heard we
refrain from further comment.
In The Journal of Accountancy for
June, 1930, appeared an editorial note
advocating the introduction of political
economy as a subject in all accounting examinations for C. P. A.
certification or for admission to the Institute. In the course of
that editorial it was stated that Maryland was the only state
which had an examination in political economy. This statement
was incorrect. In at least two other states, Michigan and
Wisconsin, there is examination in this subject. We extend
thanks to correspondents who have brought this matter to
attention and apologize for forgetfulness.
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